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To this threat, the research communit y has answered with a growing interest in intrusion detection, aiming to timel y detect intruders and prevent damage. We believe that the detection problem is a ke y component in the field of intrusion detection.
Our studies, however, made us realize that additional research is needed, in particular focusing on validation and automatic tuning of Intrusion Detection S y stems (IDSs).
The contribution of this thesis is that it develops a structured approach to intrusion detection that focuses on (i) s y stem valida tion and (ii) automatic s y stem tuning. We developed our approach b y focusing on network flows, which ofl"er an aggregated view of network traffic and help to cope with scalabilit y issues. An interesting approach to validation is the creation of appropriate testbeds, or ground-truth data sets, for which it is known when an attack has taken place. First, we obtained ground-truth infor mation for flow-based intrusion detection b y manually creating it. The outcome of our research is the first publicl y released flow-based labeled data set. Second, we generated ground truth information in an automatic manner, b y means of probabilistic traffic models based on Hidden Markov Models (HMMs).
Finall y , we approached the problem of automatic tuning of IDSs. The performance of an IDS is governed b y the trade-off between detecting all anomalies (at the expense of raising alarms too often), and missing anomalies (but not issuing man y false alarms). We developed an optimization procedure that aims to mathematicall y treat such trade-off in a s y stematic manner, b y automaticall y tuning the s y stem parameters.
I. MOTIVATIONS
As users, we are day by day increasingly dependent on the Internet. In Fig. 1 , we show the world average number of Internet users per 100 inhabitants in 2009, as reported by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) [11] . Among the developed countries, Internet usage is pervasive. For ex ample, the Netherlands has on average more than 89 Internet users per 100 inhabitants. If we consider that 90% of the Dutch population is between 5 and 80 years old I, we may say that virtually everybody in a suitable age is nowadays using the Internet. Internauts all over the world are connected at work and at home, and e-mails have almost completely substituted envelopes and stamps. We browse the latest news on our phone and we smile when our favorite cafe offers free WiFi.
Moreover, and for some a bit worryingly, the Internet is the virtual space in which we are nowadays used to managing our At the basis of the situation that we have described, there is certainly the technological push at infrastructure level which we witnessed in the last decade. Nowadays an access speed of 1-10 Gbps is not unusual, and since bandwidth for wired connections is definitely not a problem anymore, more and more high-bandwidth services are being offered to the users.
We should realize, however, that, behind the scenes, this technological improvement has paved the way to new chal lenges. First, the amount of Internet traffic, as well as the line speed, continues to grow. A university network, for example, reaches traffic averages in the order of hundreds of Mbps, with high activity peaks in the order of Gbps. On backbone networks, as for example Internet2 [12] , the USA research and education backbone, the throughput is even higher (see Fig. 2 ).
Such amounts of data need to be managed and monitored, and new strategies to cope with an average load of multiple Gbps have to be developed. Second, the number of attacks does also continue to grow. The reason behind this is in itself very sim ple: attacks are getting economically more and more profitable.
SPAM is an example of this phenomenon. SPAM represents a form of pervasive advertisement, but it is, increasingly often, also a mean to gather personal information. Experts estimate that 90% of the worldwide sent mail messages are SPAM [1] [13], and the phenomenon does not seem to decline.
The combination of increasing network load and attack frequency is challenging if we are aiming to effectively detect 
II. INTRUSION DETECTION
According to KrUgel et al. [15] , "intrusion detection is the process of identifying and responding to malicious activities targeted at computing and network resources". An intrusion attempt, also named attack, refers to a sequence of actions by means of which an intruder attempts to gain control of a system. A misuse-based IDS, also known as signature-based or knowledge-based IDS, performs detection by comparing new data with a knowledge base of known attacks. An alarm is generated if a previously specified pattern is recognized.
The strength of a misuse-based IDS lies in being highly accurate, but its effectiveness depends on the completeness of the signatures. Therefore, a misuse-based system cannot recognize new attacks.
An anomaly-based IDS, also known as behavior-based IDS, compares input data with a model of normality, which describes the expected behavior of the monitored system. A significant deviation from the model is marked as an anomaly.
The main advantage of an anomaly-based IDS is that it can potentially detect also attacks that have never been seen before.
An IDS aims to discriminate between intrusion attempts and normal activities. In doing so, however, an IDS can introduce classification mistakes, usually known as false positives and false negatives. There is a natural trade-off between detecting all malicious events (at the expense of raising alarms too often, i.e., having high false positives), and missing anomalies (i.e., having high false negatives, but not issuing many false alarms).
Which component of the trade-off is more important is a case specific decision, and ideally, we would want to optimize both components. We might want to identify all malicious attempts, because this would make our network safer. However, this would be of no use if the number of alerts would overload the IT specialist responsible for handling them.
A. Flow-based Intrusion Detection
An IDS would need to be able to handle the growing number of attacks, the rise in the amount of traffic as well as the increase in line speed [2] . However, researchers assess the payload-based IDSs processing capability to lie between 100
Mbps and 200 Mbps when commodity hardware is used [18] , and close to 1 Gbps when dedicated hardware is employed [19] . Well-known systems like, e.g., Snort [20] , exhibit high resource consumption when confronted with the overwhelming amount of data found in today high-speed networks [21] .
Given these problems, flow-based approaches seem to be promising candidates for intrusion detection research. Flows are monitored by specialized accounting modules usually placed in network routers. These modules are responsible for exporting reports of flow activity to external collectors.
Flow-based IDSs will analyze these flows to detect attacks. at network traffic, i.e., in a streaming manner. The popularity of this approach is reflected by the widespread use of tools like, among others, the Netflow Sensor (NfSen) suite [22] . In this thesis, we combine time series analysis with flow-based intrusion detection. We aim to investigate how it is possible to describe anomalous events by mathematically considering the evolution over time of flows, packets and bytes.
In any case, it is important to underline that flow-based intrusion detection is not supposed to substitute the packet based one, but rather to complement packets-based methods by allowing early detection in environments in which payload based inspection is not scalable.
III. OPEN ISSUES IN INTRUSION DETECTION
Flow-based intrusion detection is a relatively new research field, the early contributions of which date back to the first decade of this century [2] . Flow-based intrusion detection builds upon previous experiences in intrusion detection, but faces different challenges, for example the absence of payload.
Like payload-based intrusion detection, however, it has a distinct problem-oriented attitude: with the number of attacks almost exponentially increasing [2] , and the attackers' motiva tions moving from ideological to economical, the researchers' attention is focused on developing new techniques to timely detect intruders and prevent damage. Our studies in the field of flow-based intrusion detection, however, made us realize that other research directions are possible, especially if we consider that flow-based intrusion detection is a discipline placed at the intersection between network monitoring and security. Here we point out two problems that, in our opinion, need attention.
First, in the network monitoring community, the importance of sharing network traces for development, validation and comparison purposes is well understood. Examples are repos itories like Caida DATA [23] , Crawdad [24] and Simpleweb [25] . In intrusion detection, data sets also play a central role, with the difference being that researchers usually evaluate new approaches by testing them on data sets for which the malicious or benign nature of the data is known. We refer to these traces as ground-truth data sets. Considering the current situation, research on IDS generally suffers from a lack of shared ground-truth data sets. High-quality ground truth data sets are time consuming to create and often rely on privacy-sensitive data. Therefore, most publications use non public traffic traces for evaluation purposes, and we have no knowledge of any publicly available ground-truth flow-based data set. This is generally an obstacle to the comparison of different IDS approaches.
Second, we may certainly say that each new approach to intrusion detection brings us a step forward towards having a safer network. However, we often forget that, for an intrusion detection system to be deployed, we keep "the man in the loop". With this, we mean that, once a new approach has been developed, it is generally assumed that expert I T personnel will take care of the operational aspects in a specific network. This assumption is motivated by the fact that any IDS, to be effec tive, needs to be tuned according to the specific characteristics of the monitored network. However, this also means that only the expertise of the security operator ensures us that an IDS is tuned to be used in the best way possible. We wonder therefore whether the problem of parameter tuning for IDS could be treated in a more systematic manner, leaving the security expert free to focus on high-level policies (such as maximum allowed false positive rate, or relative importance assigned to false positive and false negative rates) instead of understanding how the IDS works. This reasoning relates to the wider concept of autonomic management. Citing Horn [26] , who proposed in 2001 the idea of the Autonomic Computing Initiative ( ACI), an autonomic system allows "users to concentrate on what they want to accomplish rather than figuring how to rig the computing systems to get them there." Applied to an IDS, this means that we want to achieve the desired (optimal) performance without knowing the details of the underlying system. The task of the security expert would therefore be to specify security policies, and the system should implement these policies to provide detection according to a provided optimality criterion.
IV. GOAL AND ApPROACH
In light of the reasoning so far, the goal of this thesis is to develop a structured approach to intrusion detection that focuses on (i) system validation, by means of shared ground truth data sets and (ii) automatic system tuning, by tuning the system parameters. We develop our approach in the context of detecting anomalies using flow data and time series. To achieve this goal, we answer the following research questions: We approach the parameter tuning problem in a probabilistic manner by addressing the trade-off between correct detection and detection errors. We explicitly take into account the fact that the optimal solution may depend on the situation, meaning that it can change according to specific network and user requirements. Finally, we support our approach by extensively validating it on synthetic and original data sets.
V. CONTRIBUTION AND IMPACT
We believe that the problem of anomaly detection in flow data should be approached by bringing into focus topics as validation and tuning of IDSs. Our general conclusion is therefore that the research attention, focused mainly on solving the detection problem by developing new IDSs, should be enlarged to include issues that can be considered as a basis of intrusion detection: publicly available ground-truth data sets and optimal parameter tuning. Considering the trends we observed regarding bandwidth provisioning and traffic load, but also number and intensity of attacks, it is likely that intrusion detection is going to remain a core research area for future networks. We expect that this thesis can bring new awareness in perceiving intrusion detection as a structured group of research areas: not only development of detection systems, but also system validation and tuning (see Fig. 4 ). Intrusion detection as consisting of system development, system validation and system tuning.
Our research provided the following answers to the Research
Questions presented in Sec. IV .
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Brute-force phase Die-off phase start Fig. 5 . Model for SSH dictionary attack traffic. The attack evolves through a scan phase, followed by a brute-force dictionary phase and it ends with a die-off phase.
A. Research Question 1: What is the state of the art in the field of flow-based intrusion detection?
In our work, we presented a survey of the state of the art in flow-based intrusion detection [2] . Flow-based intrusion detection is a relatively recent field of research, whose first contributions date back to 2002. Since then, several approaches to the problem of detection have been proposed. By analyzing and categorizing them, we identified the major trends in the field. We concluded that the research efforts are at the moment focused on passive and centralized solutions with, primarily, centralized data collection. Moreover, we also noticed an evenly shared interest between anomaly-based and misuse based systems and a clear attention for real-time systems.
B. Research Question 2: How can traffic anomalies be char acterized in time series derived from flow data?
In our research, we focused on anomaly characterization in time series. In [3] , we presented an extensive data analysis on flow-data from the University of Twente and SURFnet, the Dutch national research and education network . Our analysis led us to the following conclusions. First, time series of flows, packets and bytes can be a suitable approach to flow-based intrusion detection, since they allow data analysis by keeping into account temporal relations between events, in this case the amount of traffic. Second, to more clearly identify and characterize anomalies, we suggest performing an application based traffic breakdown. With this we mean that anomalies that are not noticeable by considering the whole traffic can be identified by looking at, for example, only SSH or DNS traffic (see Fig. 3 ). The traffic breakdown can therefore empower flow-based intrusion detection by reducing the amount of data to be analyzed and by facilitating anomalies exposure. This observation suggests that a feasible approach to flow-based intrusion detection should encompass the design of modular intrusion detection systems targeting specific applications. Moreover, the combined analysis of flow, packet and byte time series can strengthen the certainty of the presence of an attack. However, for certain classes of attacks, the choice to monitor only some of the aforementioned metrics can be sufficient.
C. Research Question 3: How can we determine ground-truth information for flow-based intrusion detection?
Our results cover the fields of manual and automatic ground truth generation.
First, we investigated the creation of a flow-based data set of security-relevant events [4] , where each of the attacks has been manually labeled. Building this type of data set can be challenging. Our research covered several aspects of the problem, namely which requirements should such a data set meet, which infrastructure is suitable for data collection and, finally, how the collected data can be labeled. Our findings showed that the most promising measurement setup among the analyzed ones is monitoring a single host with enhanced logging capabilities. The collected information permitted us to create a database of both flows and security events (derived by the logs). However, we are aware of the limitations that our approach entails, in particular, the fact that the collected trace mainly consists of malicious traffic. As results of our research, we built and publicly released a flow-based labeled data set. At the best of our knowledge, our effort constitutes the first publicly available labeled flow-based traffic trace. The data set is available in anonymized form at the address: http://traces.simpleweb.org. Despite this favorable outcome, the lesson learned is that, although we limited our experiments to a single host, labeling remains a complex task that requires human intervention.
In our work, we also investigated the possibility of gener ating ground-truth information in an automated manner [5] . We proposed a modeling approach for flow-based traffic time series based on HMMs. We showed that the models that we developed provided a compact representation of the traffic, where only few states are needed to fully describe the traffic evolution. Moreover, HMMs can be used for generative pur poses, allowing us to create time series for which the ground truth is known. The models we proposed are inferred by studying real SSH traffic time series for both attack and normal traffic, captured at the University of Twente. Fig. 5 shows the model describing an SSH dictionary attack. The research in the thesis showed that: (i) our HMM-based approach can capture the main statistical characteristics of the original time series; (ii) by qualitative investigation, our approach can reproduce time series that resemble the real traffic; and (iii) as far as ground truth is concerned, we are now able to create labeled data sets in an automated manner. The performance of an IDS is governed by the trade-off between false positives and false negatives. We proposed a mathematical framework, in terms of an optimization proce dure, to treat such trade-off in a systematic manner. We tested our procedure on a history-based, probabilistic and anomaly based detection system. Such a simple model became our demo system. We then proposed a probabilistic optimization procedure that, by solving a non-linear optimization problem, tunes the parameters of the detection system such as the history Automatic system tuning: calculate the optimal threshold (j that maximizes TN and minimizes F P, given a probabilistic representation of benign and malicious traffic (window size 100).
length and the alert threshold. The goal of the procedure was to maximize the correct detection (true negative) and minimize the errors (false positive) (see Fig. 6 ). Since the proposed procedure explicitly regarded optimality according to the high level policies, we studied the impact of such policies on the overall performance of the system.
VI. THESIS MATERIAL
The thesis can be downloaded from http://wwwhome. CS. utwente. nlF aresperottoalresearch. html.
The page also contains the list of publications concerning the context of this thesis.
